Phillip Johnson and Kathleen Brownell were a married couple when Phillip was diagnosed with cognitive impairment. In anticipation of applying for Medicaid, Phillip transferred all of his assets to a trust with his son, Scott Johnson, as successor trustee. Ms. Brownell filed for divorce, and under the divorce settlement, Ms. Brownell agreed to have no interest in the trust and Phillip agreed to pay her alimony.
Phillip suffered a
farm injury in July 2015, which injury coincided with Phillip’s mental decline. He transitioned to a nursing home that same month. He continued to live there at the
time of the underlying trial in January 2019. Phillip was at first not eligible for
nursing home compensation through Medicaid because the Johnson Farm
Account Trust had been set up within five years. Phillip became eligible in July
2017—when the five-year lookback period expired. Phillip paid Ms. Brownell alimony until he entered a nursing home, at which point Scott began managing his affairs as agent under a power of attorney.
Ms. Brownell sued Scott for intentional interference with a contract for failing to make the alimony payments. Scott testified that his duty as trustee was to qualify Phillip for Medicaid and preserve the family real estate, not to pay Ms. Brownell who had, as a result of the divorce, become a creditor of Phillip. The parties stipulated that she was owed $25,200
in alimony as of the trial. Kathleen further testified that she borrowed $2500 from a
daughter, $4500 from another daughter, and $7698 from her son to live on while
she was not receiving her alimony payments. She also testified she incurred about
$19,000 in attorney fees and had taken $15,000 in cash value from the life
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insurance policy to keep the payments up to date on that policy. Kathleen asked
for $74,000 in damages. A trial was conducted and the jury found for Ms. Brownell, awarding her damages.
Scott appealed.
It is interesting to note that on appeal, the Iowa Academy of Trust and Estate Counsel sought leave to file an amicus brief, which the Iowa Supreme Court granted. The amicus’s stated purpose in filing an appellate brief was to “assure that [our] disposition of the appeal does not result in the adoption of a standard that the trustee of a trust owes any duty to the creditor of a beneficiary of a trust when the trustee is making distributions to other beneficiaries of the trust in compliance with terms of the trust.” Brownell at p. 2-3. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Scott cannot be held liable under an interference with contract theory as a matter of law. The court ruled that “Scott, acting as the trustee, had to make decisions that were best for the beneficiaries without concerning himself whether those actions interfered with Phillip’s ability to make his alimony payments.” The court similarly found that Scott’s motives of “preserving assets for his father’s care and upholding the estate plan” were not improper under his role as agent.
The court wrote that
"...the trust and trustee owed no duty to Kathleen as a creditor of a trust beneficiary (Phillip). “Persons who may incidentally benefit in some manner from the performance of the trust are not beneficiaries of the trust and cannot enforce it.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 48 cmt. a (Am. Law. Inst. Oct. 2020 Update). The Iowa Academy of Trust and Estate Counsel raised this concern. And the amicus implores us to find that Scott had no duty to Phillip’s creditors when he, acting in his capacity as trustee in compliance with the terms of the trust, decided what distributions to make and to whom. The undisputed duty of loyalty of a trustee is to the beneficiaries of the trust, not the creditor of any beneficiary. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78(1).
First, both Kathleen and Scott confirmed that the trust purpose was twofold. One purpose was to qualify Phillip for Medicaid benefits, which required Phillip to maintain a limited net worth of $2000 and a limited monthly income. The second purpose was to ensure that Phillip’s sons retained the family real estate. To effectuate this purpose, Kathleen admits in her brief that after all real estate was transferred to the trust she “disclaimed and surrendered any and all interest she may have in the Trust.” Also with those goals in mind, Scott maintains he fulfilled his obligations as trustee in the manner he was supposed to; he stopped making income distributions to Phillip so that his father could remain eligible for Medicaid nursing home coverage. Then after the qualification for Medicaid, he transferred the trust assets to the beneficiaries to preserve their interests in the family real estate. Scott notes that he relied on the advice of several attorneys in taking these actions.
. . .
Kathleen acknowledged the trust goals that Scott followed. But at trial and in her brief, she argues in his role as trustee, his failure to pay her interfered with her contract between herself and Phillip. But Kathleen is not a creditor of the trust. Even the jury found the trust owed her nothing. Thus, Scott, operating as trustee, owed Kathleen no fiduciary duty. See Iowa Code §633A.4202(1) (“A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries, and shall act with due regard to their respective interests.”).
[Second], drilling down to the specific improper conduct of Scott as agent, Kathleen argues Scott “felt entitled to pick and choose which bills ultimately got paid.” It then follows, under Kathleen’s theme, Scott was not acting on behalf of or in Phillip’s best interest. And Kathleen emphasizes that Scott testified he did not like that his father was ordered to pay alimony because he thought it was unfair. So does refusing to pay the principal’s creditor amount to improper conduct by the agent under an interference-of-contract claim? If we step back from this case, we would plow new ground to hold that an agent acting under a power of attorney must pay all bills of the principal or risk a claim of interference with a contract by a creditor. An agent, acting for the principal, might decide to prioritize which bills to pay, and if a creditor finds the action wrongful, the remedy is breach of contract. The motives of Scott in preserving assets for his father’s care and upholding the estate plan, which all parties acknowledged in this case, is not improper under his role as agent. Scott exercised financial discretion to protect his father’s legal rights, and Kathleen failed to prove his sole motivation was to defeat the alimony contract. [citation omitted, emphasis added]. Thus, the record does not support a finding of wrongful conduct against Scott as an agent for Phillip.
The court noted that Ms. Brownell still has a breach of contract claim for alimony against Phillip.
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