Filial responsibility laws often lead family chaos to spill-over into the legal system. A recent Pennsylvania case, involving a claim by one child against his brother and sister illustrates the ensuing chaos, and the case does not involve Medicaid!
Joseph Eori is the attorney-in-fact for his mother, Dolly Eori, who requires 24-hour care. Mr. Eori lives with his mother and provides management of her care and resources. Mr. Eori testified that his mother's medical and caregiving expenses exceeded her income. Although Ms. Eori had not filed for Medicaid, and apparently did not require Medicaid assistance, and was on no other form of public assistance, Mr. Eori filed a complaint on behalf of his mother seeking filial support from his brother, Joshua Ryan, and from his sister Paulette Rush. The daughter entered into a consent order to pay her mother $400.00 per month in filial support before trial.
Mr. Ryan, however, objected to paying anything on behalf of his mother on a number of grounds. He lost at the trial court, and the Court entered an Order for Filial Support requiring Ryan to pay his mother Dolly Eori $400 per month in support. Ryan appealed the judgment against him.
Mr. Ryan first argued that his mother was not legally indigent because she did not have outstanding medical bills. The court ruled against him, even though her medical and other bills were wholly satisfied. The court, refusing to resort to receipts and detailed checking account statements as demanded by Mr. Ryan, relied upon the testimony and documents submitted by the caregiving son. The court recounted the testimony:
Plaintiff [the caregiving son] testified that his mother is diagnosed with cancer, dementia and Alzheimer's disease and requires twenty-four hour care. During the day, she goes to Senior Life adult day care. For the remaining hours, Plaintiff is responsible for ensuring that someone is available to care for his Mother. There are currently three individuals that provide that care, and he pays each of them in cash. He pays them a total of $1,722 per month for the care. According to Plaintiff's testimony, he has not been able to obtain care for his mother on weekends because she cannot afford it. Therefore, the total amount is not even reflective of the full care that Ms. Eori needs.
In addition to the caregiver costs, Plaintiff estimates that Ms. Eori spends an additional $1,000 per month on hygiene items, cleaning expenses, and diapers. The electric bill is an additional $250 per month and there is a deduction evidenced on her bank statements for Verizon at approximately $95 per month. These basic needs already total more than Ms. Eori's monthly income, and the bank statements submitted by Defendant evidence additional expenses for medical needs, such as a payment of $773 to Prime Medical Group in July 2012 and another $115 payment in September 2012. To further show the disparity between Ms. Eori's income and expenses, Plaintiff admitted a bank statement for January 2014 showing a deposit of $1789 and a withdrawal of $1779.67.
Based on the evidence and testimony presented, the Appellate Court determined that Ms. Eori did in fact satisfy the common law definition of "indigent." The appellate court agreed that "[a]lthough she is not extremely destitute, she has sought financial assistance in the past and does not have sufficient income to provide for her maintenance and support." The appellate court continued:
...the definition of indigent does not state that outstanding debt is necessary for an individual to qualify as indigent. It just requires an inability to provide for ones [sic] own maintenance and support with the income received. The mere fact that Ms. Eori has been able to remain out of debt does not eliminate her from the definition of an indigent person. One does not have to be "helpless" or in "extreme want." Therefore, the Court did not err in finding Ms. Eori indigent merely because there was no evidence of unpaid or outstanding medical bills or other liabilities.
Ryan next argued that the Trial Court committed error in failing to consider the fact that Plaintiff, as power of attorney for Ms. Eori, claimed her as a dependent on his 2013 Federal Income Tax return. Federal law required the Plaintiff to be responsible for at least fifty percent of Ms. Eori's expenses in order to claim the deduction. The court held that while this may be true for federal income tax purposes, it failed to see how that impacted the determination that Ms. Eori is indigent. The court wrote: "[i]f her son has to provide at least fifty percent of her expenses to maintain her daily needs, then she, on her own, is clearly indigent." The court failed to determine whether the son, in fact, contributed such sum, and failed to consider the benefit the son derived from the deduction, a fact that will later demonstrate why these matters are so poorly resolved by legal means.
Ryan next argued that the Trial Court erred in failing to consider the amount Plaintiff contributes to Ms. Eori's support. The court agreed that from 2012 to 2014, Ms. Eori's bank account has never had a negative balance. However, the positive balance was not, according to the Plaintiff, the result of Ms. Eori's income. Plaintiff testified that he used his personal money to maintain a $2800 balance in case of an emergency, and because there are no burial plans for his Mother. The court did not, however, consider and recount the actual amounts contributed by the caregiving son, noting simply that his occasional need to support his mother evidenced her legal indigence.
Ryan finally argued that he had been estranged from his mother and that he had an abusive childhood. Ryan was initially sued as Russell Eori. Although his birth name was Russell Eori, Russell Eori obtained a legal name change to Joshua Ryan. The record was unclear whether the childhood abuse played any role in his name change. Pennsylvania's filial responsibility law negates the support obligation if the parent abandoned the child for a 10-year period. The court ruled that his testimony was legally insufficient to constitute a defense to his support obligation. The court explained:
The term "abandoned" is not defined in the act itself. However, the Custody Act at 23 Pa. C.S.A. §5402 defines "abandoned" as "left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision." Defendant testified that he did not have the greatest family growing up and he wanted to get away. (N.T. 6/5/14 pg. 66, lines 8-13). He testified that his grandmother cared for him more than his Mother; however, they were never far apart because he testified that his grandmother either lived with Mother or beside Mother. (N.T. 6/5/14 pg. 61, lines 21-25 and pg. 62, lines 1-7). Although he testified that Mother was abusive, left and caused them to move many times, and was either gone or fighting, he never established that she left for a ten year period. He did not provide details or time periods on any of the testimony presented. Therefore, it was not clear from his testimony that Mother ever left for a ten year period without provision for his reasonable and necessary care or supervision. Although it may not have been an ideal childhood, there was no evidence of abandonment to release Defendant from his obligation to support Mother.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that Mr. Ryan is required to provide support to his mother. The court agreed with the trial court's decision that the filial responsibility law doesn't require a showing of unpaid bills or liabilities to justify a claim. In addition, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that while Mr. Ryan may not have had an ideal childhood, there was no evidence that his mother abandoned him.
There was no explanation regarding the $800.00 in ordered support, and whether that bore any equitable relationship to the occasional financial support provided by the caregiving son, or whether any financial support was even necessary under the statute since he performed non-monetary services. The court did note that the caregiving son might also be responsible for financial support, but failed to address the issue since it was subject of the lawsuit. The court did not explain whether the caregiving son would, in fact, need to sue himself before the court would consider such an argument, or whether refusing to consider the care giving son's potential liability left the other children responsible for their mom's care. In fact one might conclude, as did Ryan, that the son benefited financially from providing services to his mother (in that he received a tax deduction, a place to live, and meal and transportation opportunities) which benefits were not considered by the court.
One can expect more lawsuits under filial responsibility statutes and laws.
