Esther's Law Protects Ohio Seniors in Nursing and Rehabilitation Institutions by Permitting Cameras and Monitoring

Residents of Ohio’s nursing homes are permitted to place electronic monitoring devices in their rooms. “Esther’s Law” went into effect on March 23, 2022, after passing unanimously through the Ohio House and Senate and being signed by Governor Mike DeWine on December 22, 2021. This bipartisan legislation demonstrates that ridding Ohio is committed to reducing elder abuse generally, and particularly in institutions charged with caring for Ohio's vulnerable elderly residents. 

The genesis of Esther’s Law (Ohio Revised Code § 3721.60, et seq.), was a shocking video depicting the abuse of the bill’s namesake, Esther Piskor, at the hands of her nursing home care providers. Esther’s son Steve Piskor suspected his mother was the victim of abuse in an Ohio nursing home. In September 2011, Steve placed a hidden camera in his mother’s room which caught and documented six weeks of abuse. Nurses and aides threw Esther around the room, sprayed her in the face with unknown substances, and yelled at and neglected her. Mr. Piskor has since worked to ensure Elder Abuse will be driven out of Ohio’s nursing homes.

The law allows a nursing home resident, the resident’s guardian, or the resident's agent under a power of attorney, to authorize the installation of an electronic monitoring device in the resident's room under the following conditions: (1) the resident or the resident’s representative completes and submits a form to the facility, if the facility prescribes a form for the device and (2) the resident pays for the cost of the device and its upkeep. A resident may withdraw authorization at any time.

If the resident has a roommate, the consent of the other resident is required before any monitoring device may be installed. The roommate may consent based on certain conditions, such as agreed upon angling of the device, or limitations as to the use of the device. Devices must be installed and used in accordance with the consent of all residents residing in the room.

Nursing home operators and their staff should also be aware that the law requires reasonable attempts to accommodate residents to be made where a resident wishes to install an electronic monitoring device, but a roommate refuses to consent. Reasonable accommodation expressly includes moving the resident to another room where installation would be permitted if available.

The scope of Esther’s Law is currently limited to “long-term care” facilities defined as nursing homes and skilled nursing facilities and currently does not extend to assisted-living accommodations that do not meet the “long-term care facility” classification.  State legislators have indicated, however, that the scope of Esther’s Law may expand to other types of facilities in the near future.

Steve Piskor and the State Senators sponsoring Esther’s Law state that the goal of the law is to prevent abuse in the first instance, and not to be a reactive tool after abuse has occurred. This goal is made clear and is served by the law permitting long-term care facilities to place notices outside of the resident’s room to notify others that electronic monitoring is taking place.  In other words, the law is not intended to encourage secretive monitoring merely to encourage or facilitate litigation.

The law also prohibits any denial of admission, discharge, discrimination, or retaliation based on a resident’s decision to exercise the right to install an electronic monitoring device.  

Obviously, seniors and family members should seriously consider the use of such devices.  Keep in mind that even inexpensive and relatively unreliable devices will result in the placing of a notice that a device is electronic monitoring is taking place. Many home residents and merchants purchase signs advising that security systems and electronic surveillance exists, even where no such systems or devices are employed; deterrence is the first goal of any security or safety system or plan. 

Judge Can Not Impose an ‘Unusual’ Condition on a Reversal of a Default Judgment in a Nursing Home Breach of Contract Lawsuit

Nursing homes are proficient in protecting themselves from risk of loss where Medicaid is concerned.  Spouses and children of the Medicaid applicants often find themselves being sued to recover for delays in seeking and obtaining Medicaid.

Courts and the law are often sympathetic to the cause of the nursing home, particularly when admission agreements include provisions making family responsible.  In a recent case, the "sympathy" crossed a line towards activism on behalf of the institution.  Fortunately, on appeal, the ship of equity was righted.

George Brown entered a nursing home and signed an admission agreement, agreeing to apply for Medicaid benefits to pay for his care. Mr. Brown did not submit the necessary information to complete his Medicaid application, so his application was denied. The nursing home sued Mr. Brown and his wife, Gloria Brown, for breach of contract and her for lack of spousal support. Ms. Brown appeared at the initial hearing and argued that Mr. Brown had dementia and did not knowingly sign the agreement. In addition, she claimed he was mistreated at the nursing home.

The judge informed Ms. Brown that she needed to file an answer to the nursing home’s complaint. Ms. Brown never filed an answer, and the judge entered a default judgment against her. Six months later, Ms. Brown filed a request to remove the default judgment because she had been in the hospital and therefore unable to answer the Complaint. The judge granted her request to vacate the default judgment on the condition that she waive any claims against the nursing home to the extent the monetary recovery amount exceeded the amount Mr. Brown owed to the nursing home. The court, in effect, protected the nursing home from any risk of losing more than it was owed! Ms. Brown refused the condition and appealed.

The Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed, holding that the condition imposed by the judge was inappropriate.   Care One Management, LLC v. Brown (Mass. Ct. App., No. 19-P-1165, Oct. 7, 2020). Because the judge did not find that the nursing home suffered any prejudice from the default or the delays, there existed no authority for the court to , in essence, protect the nursing home. According to the court, although the judge made passing reference to Ms. Brown’s delay in fighting the default judgment, the judge “did not explain how or why such factors impacted [the nursing home’s] claim, and did not evaluate and explain whether and to what extent [the nursing home] suffered any prejudice, before imposing the unusual condition on the removal of the default judgment.”

The legal system worked to restore balance in this case.  The wife, though, has attendant cost and expense for which she will never be compensated.  This is just one unavoidable cost of institutional care, dutifully protected by the legal system. 

Agent Under Power of Attorney Liable for Damages to Nursing Home for Breach of Contract

Nursing homes have devised numerous strategies to legally seek reimbursement from residents' family members in light of federal and state laws prohibiting them from demanding that family members personally guarantee payment of  a resident's nursing home bill. The Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), for example, which governs skilled nursing facilities and nursing facilities accepting Medicare and Medicaid assisted residents facilities cannot “require a third party guarantee of payment to [its] facility as a condition of admission (or expedited admission) to, or continued stay in, [its] facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395i–3(c)(5)(A)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii); see also 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(2).  

Nursing Home admission agreements are, therefore, filled with alternate provisions, such as those requiring that family member or agents assist in obtaining Medicaid or other government assistance, or those requiring family member agents to ensure that the resident's assets are spent down on nursing home care.  Planners are concerned that these provisions might negate or interfere with otherwise lawful spend down strategies, such as spending assets for improvement of a home, or for purchase of a car for a resident's spouse.  

Supporting these efforts to find alternative reimbursement is a recent decision by an Ohio Court of Appeals.  The Court ruled in favor of a nursing home suing a resident's agent for breach of contract, holding that the nursing home is entitled to damages if the agent had control of liquid assets at the time the nursing home invoice came due even though some of the assets were paid to maintain the resident's home. Classic Healthcare Systems, LLC v. Miracle (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist., No. CA2017-03-029, Nov. 13, 2017).

David Miracle was his mother's agent under a power of attorney. When his mother entered a nursing home, he signed the admission agreement on her behalf and agreed to use his mother's finances to pay the facility. Mr. Miracle paid the nursing home infrequently, and his mother owed more than $100,000 by the time she was discharged.

The nursing home sued Mr. Miracle for breach of contract. Evidence showed that Mr. Miracle used $56,486.63 of his mother's resources to maintain her real estate and spent an additional $12,971.54 on payments not related to his mother. The trial court found that the additional payments were unauthorized and awarded the nursing home damages in that amount. The nursing home appealed, arguing that it was also entitled to the money that was used to maintain Mr. Miracle's mother's home.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.  The Court held that the nursing home is entitled to damages for breach of contract if Mr. Miracle "had control over liquid assets at the time an invoice came due." The court ruled that the trial court improperly looked at the entire nursing home stay as one transaction. According to the court, if Mr. Miracle "had control of [his mother's] liquid assets on the due date that were not paid to [the nursing home] then that amount constitutes damages properly payable to [the nursing home]."

For the full text of the opinion, go here. 

Nursing Homes Cannot Hold Residents' Family Members Who Signed Admission Agreements Personally Responsible for Cost

Courts continue to protect family members of nursing home residents from efforts by institutions to hold family members personally responsible for residents' expense.  These actions are becoming more prevalent as States tighten Medicaid restrictions, leaving more residents with outstanding obligations to the nursing home.  

An Ohio appellate court recently reversed the decision of a trial holding that a son is not personally liable for breach of contract after his father was discharged from a nursing home for non-payment even though the son breached his duty to his father as agent under a power of attorney. Extendicare Health Services v. Dunkerton (Ohio Ct. App., 11th Dist., No. 2015-P-0004, Feb. 6, 2017).

Herbert Dunkerton entered a nursing home after he broke his leg. His son, Michael, signed the admission agreement as his agent under a power of attorney. After Herbert's Medicare coverage was terminated, the nursing home asked that Michael apply for Medicaid on his father's behalf. Michael never applied for Medicaid, and the nursing home eventually discharged Herbert for nonpayment.

The nursing home sued Michael for breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance of Herbert's funds. The trial court ruled that Michael breached his duty as his father’s attorney-in-fact when he refused to apply for Medicaid for his father and entered judgment in the amount of $25,228.43. Michael appealed, arguing that he was not a guarantor of his father's debt.

The Ohio Court of Appeals, Eleventh District, reversed, holding that even though Michael breached his duty as attorney-in-fact, Michael did not breach the admissions agreements with the nursing home. According to the court, Michael "signed the admission agreement and the payor confirmation as his father’s attorney-in-fact, and neither document provides that appellant was Herbert’s voluntary guarantor," so Michael was not responsible for his father's debt pursuant to these agreements. The court notes that under state law an attorney-in-fact can be personally liable under certain circumstances, but the nursing home did not raise the state law in its complaint.


For the full text of this decision, go here.

A North Carolina appellate court recently dismissed a breach of contract lawsuit against a nursing home resident's daughter even though the daughter signed the admission agreement on the grounds that the resident was named as representative in the agreement. Wrightsville Health Holdings, LLC v. Buckner (N.C. Ct. App., No. COA16-726, Feb. 21, 2017).

When Sharon Buckner entered a nursing home, her daughter, Melissa, signed the admission agreement on her behalf. The agreement stated that Sharon was the "resident" and the "representative," but Melissa signed the agreement and initialed the portion stating that the representative agreed to personally guarantee payment in the event the resident's Medicaid application was denied. The nursing home demanded that Melissa pay Sharon's unpaid bill.

After Melissa refused to pay, the nursing home sued her for breach of contract. Melissa filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion. The nursing home appealed.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Melissa was not liable for breach of contract. The court ruled that because Sharon is named as resident and representative under the admission agreement, Melissa's signature at the bottom of the document "must be read as" Melissa signing on behalf of Sharon and "her signature and initials on the document merely obligated her mother to comply with the terms of the Admission Agreement."

For the full text of this decision, go here.  

Both cases underscore the importance of family members distinguishing their role as "agent" or "attorney-in-fact" when signing nursing home admissions agreements. 

ACLU Takes On Nursing Homes

McKnight's has published an excellent and illuminating editorial regarding how some seniors who need institutional care are routinely frustrated in seeking and obtaining care by the very institutions themselves.  The editorial explains, using a specific example, how the ACLU has finally involved itself in skilled nursing home placement decisions or refusals.  The editorial reads: 

As in all cases involving a resident who wasn't accepted at a nursing home, each side has a different take on what happened.

According to the Lincoln Star-Journal, Nebraska resident Courtney Shelor says her father wasn't accepted at six nursing homes because he had HIV. A statement from the ACLU followed this week, via a letter to the homes in question reminding them of state and federal law.If you missed the basic tenants around the Americans with Disabilities Act (or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), it's here.  

Accepting a person with a terminal illness into your nursing home also would hopefully be found within your own moral code.While it was 68 miles away from his family, Shelor was finally accepted at Golden Living Center in Broken Bow. I suspect that administrator or admissions director was simply doing her job, but let me say publicly: Good for you for making his last days good ones. Shelor writes that this facility “welcomed us with open arms!” While the center had never had anyone with HIV, it was able to make it work, including helping the elder Shelor be approved for Medicaid.You can read the rest of the younger Shelor's letter here, in which she talks about her father being her hero. He died at the end of July.

Go here to read the rest of the article.

Senators Seek To Ban Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements

McKight's reports that a group of senators urged the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to ban arbitration clauses inserted into nursing home admission contracts, because they do not adequately protect residents' rights.

The letter, signed by 34 Democrats including lead signer Sen. Al Franken (D-MN), said recent efforts by CMS to improve resident awareness of arbitration clauses are “well-intentioned,” but ultimately complicate any future disputes and fail to improve safety. Language aimed at improving resident awareness of the clauses was included in July's proposed rule for long-term care facilities.

The senators recommended CMS prohibit the use of binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts in order to “ensure that residents and their families are not deprived of their rights.”

“All too often, only after a resident has suffered an injury or death, do families truly understand the impact of the arbitration agreement they have already signed,” the letter states.  

The letter stresses that nursing home residents and their families should only enter into arbitration agreements after an incident has occurred, allowing them to consider all of their legal rights.

Clif Porter, senior vice president of government affairs and public policy at the American Health Care Association, said his organization disagrees with the views expressed in the senators' letter.

“We believe this is a matter Congress has already addressed through the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and rulemaking on this issue is unnecessary,” Porter wrote in an email to Bloomberg BNA.

To read an excellent article from Oklahoma Watch, regarding these clauses, go here.  The article includes a copy of such an agreement with what some believe are onerous arbitration clauses.

To read an excellent position paper regarding arbitration clauses in nursing home admission agreements from the California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR) which deconstructs the arguments supporting the clauses, go here. 

Incorrect Denial of Medicaid Benefits Not a Defense to Nursing Home Claim on Contract

A recent case illustrates that seniors, their families, and caregivers should not rely upon institutions or the state to plan for their care; the results are often unpredictable and damaging. A New York trial court has held that the fact that Medicaid wrongly denied benefits to a nursing home resident is not a defense in a breach-of-contract claim against the resident, who died leaving an unpaid bill. East End Healthcare v. Gegenheimer (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., No. 12-21672, June 29, 2015).

Anna Amico entered a nursing home and signed an admission agreement guaranteeing payment for services.  She had a reverse mortgage, and little in the way of resources, so she applied for Medicaid.  Her niece, Joan Gegenheimer, withdrew money from Ms. Amico's reverse mortgage line of credit account shortly after Ms. Amico entered the nursing home.  The proceeds were placed in a joint bank account between Amico and her niece.  The niece withdrew some funds to pay for Ms. Amico's needs at the home.  Substantial funds were turned over to Ms. Amico, who, knowing she was terminal, paid off debts to families and friends.  When Ms. Amico applied for Medicaid benefits, the state assessed a penalty period because of the transfer. Ms. Amico died owing an amount to the nursing home, which, because of the penalty period, was equal to the amount withdrawn.

Ms. Amico died before the Medicaid determination was made, and therefore, no one filed an appeal of the denial.

The nursing home sued the niece, Ms. Gegenheimer in her capacity as executrix of Ms. Amico's estate, for breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance. Ms. Gegenheimer argued that she withdrew the money from Ms. Amico's reverse mortgage account for Ms. Amico and did not keep any of the money. According to Ms. Gegenheimer, Medicaid improperly denied coverage to Ms. Amico because it counted the money in the reverse mortgage line of credit as an available resource.  The nursing home moved for summary judgment.

The New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted the nursing home summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim, but denied summary judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claim. The court held that any mistake by the state in considering Ms. Amico's reverse mortgage line of credit funds as an asset that led to the denial of Medicaid benefits is not a defense, because Ms. Amico signed a contract expressly agreeing to make private payments. The court also ruled that because there was no evidence introduced that Ms. Gegenheimer kept the money that she withdrew from Ms. Amico's account, or that the nursing home sent Ms. Amico a bill for her services, there remains  triable issues of fact as to whether Ms. Gegenheimer or Ms. Amico believed that the use of funds would make Ms. Amico insolvent.  The case was remanded to trial court for further proceedings.  

For the full text of this decision, go here.

Use of Filial Responsibility to Collect a Nursing Home Debt Survives Federal Challenges

The State of Pennsylvania is racking up victories supporting the use of filial responsibility in resource recovery of Medicaid benefits.  Future courts will likely point to the Second Circuit Court's decision in Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices (U.S. Ct. App., 2nd Cir., No. 14-104-cv, June 5, 2015) as a peculiarly important case paving the way for greater reliance upon filial responsibility.  Aside from the fact that the case concerned an effort to collect funds from a Medicaid recipient's family who were residents of another state, the court specifically rejected any claim that existing federal law preempts  state filial responsibility.

The U.S. Court of Appeals held that a law firm that was attempting to collect a debt from a nursing home resident's family did not violate debt collection law when it filed a lawsuit against the family based on Pennsylvania's filial support law.  Joni Eades' mother died owing the Pennsylvania nursing home she resided in around $8,000. The nursing home hired Kennedy, PC Law Offices to collect the debt from Ms. Eades and her father, who resided in the State of New York. Kennedy sent a letter to Ms. Eades, stating that she could be held liable for the debt under Pennsylvania's filial support statute. During a phone call with Ms. Eades, a Kennedy employee allegedly stated that if the debt was not paid, Kennedy would put a lien on her father's house and garnish her wages.

Kennedy filed a complaint against Ms. Eades and her father for failing to pay the debt. Ms. Eades and her father filed a lawsuit in federal court against Kennedy alleging that it violated the fair debt collection law. The district court granted Kennedy's motion to dismiss, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over Kennedy and that Ms. Eades’ obligation to pay the nursing home was not a debt. Ms. Eades and her father appealed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in part but remanded  part of the case. The court held that while the court does have jurisdiction over Kennedy and while Ms. Eades' obligation to pay the nursing home was a debt, there was no conflict between the federal nursing home law and Pennsylvania's support law, so filing a lawsuit under the filial support law did not violate the debt collection law.

The court held that federal law did not preempt the Pennsylvania law.  Eades argued that the federal Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), which prohibits nursing homes from requiring third party guarantees of payment, preempted the Pennsylvania law.  The court disagreed: 

"[T]he NHRA is not inconsistent with the Pennsylvania indigent support statute, which holds an indigent person’s spouse or child liable for the person’s maintenance or financial support, unless the spouse or child is financially unable to support the indigent person or meets other statutory exceptions. 23 Pa. Cons. State 4603(a).  By its terms the Pennsylvania statute does not appear to condition the continuing care of the indigent person on a family member’s financial support. Thus, a nursing home can petition a court to order an indigent resident’s spouse or child to pay for the resident’s nursing home care pursuant to the state statute without violating the NHRA, as long as the nursing home refrains from conditioning the resident’s admission, expedited admission, or continued stay on a third party guarantee of payment. For these reasons, we conclude that the indigent support statute does not conflict with the NHRA."

The court did remand the case to the district court to consider the the issue of whether the phone call from the Kennedy employee to Ms. Eades violated the debt collection law.

For the full text of this decision, go here.

Nursing Home Resident Not Entitled to Hearing on Readmission After Hospitalization

Nursing homes have almost unlimited authority to refuse to readmit a resident following a hospitalization.  This was demonstrated  recently in an Illinois appeals court case which ruled that a nursing home resident who entered a hospital while waiting for a hearing on an involuntary discharge, was not entitled to a hearing when the nursing home refused to readmit him. Gruby v. Department of Public Health (Ill. Ct. App., 2nd Dist, No. 14-MR-0354, March 26, 2015).

Marvin Gruby was a resident of Manorcare Highland Park nursing home. The nursing home issued him a discharge notice, claiming that Mr. Gruby threatened the safety of individuals in the nursing home. Mr. Gruby requested a hearing as was his right under state law. Before the hearing could take place, however, Mr. Gruby entered the hospital for a scheduled procedure. The nursing home notified Mr. Gruby that he would not be able to return to the facility after his hospitalization and it withdrew the notice of discharge.

Mr. Gruby argued that he was entitled to a hearing on the discharge. The administrative law judge determined that a hearing was no longer necessary and closed the case. Mr. Gruby appealed to court. The court ruled that the controversy became moot when the nursing home withdrew the notice of discharge. Mr. Gruby appealed, arguing that he was still a resident of the nursing home while he was in the hospital. Under federal regulations, if a nursing home resident enters a hospital for 10 days or less, the nursing home may not refuse to readmit the resident on the basis of his or her Medicaid status.

The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the administrative law judge's decision, holding that under federal nursing home law, Mr. Gruby is not entitled to a hearing for being denied readmission to the nursing home. According to the court, Mr. Gruby did not remain a resident of the nursing home once he was admitted to the hospital because the 10-day bed hold requirement applies only to the Medicaid provisions. The court rules that when the nursing home withdrew its notice of discharge, there was no longer a need for a hearing. The nursing home, in effect, is permitted to circumvent the resident's rights by simply refusing readmission of the the resident, so long as the refusal is not because of the resident's Medicaid status.  

For the full text of this decision, click here. 

Daughter Who Signed as Trustee Has Authority to Bind Mother to Nursing Home Agreement

A Kentucky appeals court recently held that a daughter who signed a nursing home's financial agreement in her capacity as trustee of her mother's irrevocable trust has authority to bind her mother to the agreement. King v. Butler Rest Home (Ky. Ct. App., No. 2012-CA-000789-MR, March 13, 2015).

When Geneva King entered a nursing home, her daughter, Diana Livengood, signed the financial agreement as trustee of Ms. King's trust. Ms. King initially paid privately for her care, but when she decided to apply for Medicaid, she stopped making payments to the nursing home. The state subsequently denied Ms. King's Medicaid application.

The nursing home sued Ms. King and Ms. Livengood in her representative capacity, seeking payment of the outstanding balance. Ms. Livengood responded that Ms. King hadn’t signed the contract and that Ms. Livengood did not have authority to bind her. The trial court granted summary judgment to the nursing home and ordered Ms. King and Ms. Livengood to pay $87,413.32. 

One of the important aspects of this decision is that Livengood seems to have been arguing that only the trust could be held responsible, and not her mother's larger non-trust estate. The court rejected the argument.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ms. Livengood has the capacity to bind her mother to the financial agreement. The court notes that the signature line on the financial agreement that Ms. Livengood signed referred to the signer as the responsible party. According to the court, by signing the agreement in this way, "[Ms.] Livengood represented that she had the capacity to bind her mother. [The nursing home] admitted [Ms.] King in reliance upon this signature."

For the full text of this decision, click here. 

Former Resident Liable to Nursing Home for Unjust Enrichment

A New York trial court has held that a nursing home is entitled to summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim against a former resident who did not pay for care, but the court denied summary judgment on a breach of contract claim against the resident's daughter.Blossom View Nursing Home v. Denner (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Wayne Cty., No. 76117, July 3, 2014).

Arnold Denner entered a nursing home, but refused to sign the admission agreement. His daughter, Linda Clevenger, eventually signed as the "responsible party." The contract stated that the responsible party was required to use the resident's resources to pay for care. Mr. Denner's co-insurance and Social Security paid for some of his care at the facility, but he left a balance of $31,318.23 when he moved out.

The nursing home sued Mr. Denner and Ms. Clevenger for breach of contract. It also stated a claim for unjust enrichment against Mr. Denner. Ms. Clevenger argued that the nursing home pressured her into signing the agreement and that her father told her not to use his resources to pay for his care. The nursing home asked for summary judgment.

The New York Supreme Court, a trial court, denied the nursing home summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, but granted it on the unjust enrichment claim. According to the court, there are triable issues of fact regarding whether the nursing home used duress in getting Ms. Clevenger to sign the admissions agreement and whether she actually had access to her father's resources. But, the court held that although the nursing home can't state a claim for breach of a contract that Mr. Denner did not sign, he is liable to the nursing home for unjust enrichment because he received and accepted its services. 

For the full text of this decision, go to: http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2014/2014-ny-slip-op-31734-u.html

Nursing Home Sues Resident's Daughter with Impunity Since Admissions Agreement Did Not Give Nursing Home The Right to Sue the Daughter

New Jersey's highest court has ruled that an admissions agreement signed by a nursing home resident's daughter did not violate federal law because it did not require the daughter to use personal funds to pay for her mother's care, notwithstanding that the nursing home actually sued the daughter personally for her mother's nursing home debt.  Manahawkin v. O'Neill (N.J., No. A-17 SEPT.TERM 2012, 071033, March 11, 2014).

Frances O'Neill admitted her mother, Elise Hopkins, to a nursing home. As her mother's agent under a power of attorney, Ms. O'Neill signed the admissions agreement, which named her as the responsible party for the purposes of paying her mother's bills. Ms. O'Neill did not sign the portion of the agreement that required the responsible party to guarantee the resident's costs. She also received a copy of the resident's bill of rights, which stated that she was not required to guarantee payment as a condition of admission.

When Ms. Hopkins died, she left an unpaid balance of $878.20. The nursing home sent Ms. O'Neill a collection action, stating that she, as the responsible party, had the obligation to pay any debts. When Ms. O'Neill didn't pay, the nursing home sued her in her personal capacity. Ms. O'Neill counterclaimed, arguing the nursing home was violating New Jersey’s Nursing Home Act, which incorporates relevant portions of the federal Nursing Home Reform Act, by asking for payment from her directly. The nursing home dropped its claim, but Ms. O'Neill asked for summary judgment on her counterclaim. The trial court denied summary judgment, and the appeals court affirmed. Ms. O'Neill appealed.

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts rulings, holding that the admissions agreement did not violate the Nursing Home Act.  The Court reasoned that the admissions agreement specifically limited Ms. O'Neill's obligation to that of paying her mother's bills with her mother's assets. The court noted that while the nursing home's collection letter was "inartfully drafted" it "did not attempt to impose on [Ms.] O'Neill an obligation to use her personal assets on her mother's behalf." Similarly, the court ruled that the nursing home's lawsuit was "lacking in detail" and "improperly pled," but it did not violate federal law because it did not allege that Ms. O'Neill was required to use her personal assets.   

So, a nursing home sues a daughter, personally, for less than a thousand dollars, and when the daughter actually counterclaims, the nursing home dismisses its action, but the daughter does not prevail on her claim since the nursing home technically did not have the right to make the claim that, if the claim actually existed, would have violated federal and state law.  Clearly. 

For the full text of the decision, go here. 

Nursing Home May Sue Resident's Daughter for Breach of Contract

A Connecticut trial court has ruled that a nursing home may sue a resident's daughter for breach of contract because she agreed to use her mother's assets or Medicaid to pay for the nursing home, even though she did not sign as a personal guarantor. Cook Willow Health Center v. Andrien (Conn. Super. Ct., No. CV116008672, Sept. 28, 2012).

Judy Andrien admitted her mother to a nursing home and signed an admissions agreement as her mother's responsible party. She agreed to take steps to ensure the nursing home was paid out of her mother's assets or by Medicaid.

The nursing home sued Ms. Andrien for breach of contract, alleging that she did not use her mother's assets to pay the nursing home or apply for Medicaid when the assets were near depletion. Ms. Andrien filed two special defenses. She argued that the admissions agreement was void and unenforceable because it made Ms. Andrien personally liable for the cost of her mother's care. She also argued the agreement was a surety contract, so the nursing home was required to meet certain preconditions before enforcing the contract. The nursing home moved to strike Ms. Andrien's two defenses.

The Connecticut Superior Court granted the nursing home's motion to strike the special defenses. The court rules that the contract does not contain a personal guarantee, so it did not violate federal law prohibiting nursing homes from requiring a third-party guarantee as a condition of admission. The court also ruled that the contract is not a surety contract, i.e., a guarantee of one party for the obligation of another to a third party.  According to the court, the nursing home's "complaint is not based upon a breach of a promise to answer for the debt of another, but rather a breach of contract."  The contract, according to the court, "does set forth a scenario in which the responsible party would be liable for any costs of care and services for the resident incurred should the resident make a transfer rendering him/her ineligible for Medicaid payment or assistance."  The Court wrote that the Complaint alleged no facts that would indicate such a scenario, but nonetheless, set aside all of Ms. Andrien's affirmative defenses, and permitted the action to proceed.   

For the full text of this decision, click here.